The Death Star: Meet the New Plan, Same as the Old Plan

The Cold War may be characterized as a time when fear and paranoia guided the international system to a constant security dilemma, resulting in the largest arms race and military buildup in history. Despite a persistent perception of fear, with occasional spikes resulting from incidents such as the Cuban missile crisis, or others that remain classified, few instances could compare with the genuine fear the Soviet leadership felt on March 23rd 1983. On that day, President Reagan openly called for the United States to begin development of a missile defense system, with the aim of ultimately limiting the threat of strategic nuclear ballistic missiles. In effect, President Reagan kicked the arms race up a notch. As a recent declassified United States intelligence document illustrates, the Reagan administration was aware of the possible Soviet responses to the strategic defense initiative (or SDI, also known to its detractors as "Star Wars"), but believed the benefits would outweigh the costs.

The common assumption surrounding American missile defense policy is that it will increase security for the United States and its allies. Twenty-four years after Reagan’s announcement, the Bush administration has made a similar gamble regarding possible international reactions and has begun deploying the first elements of a new missile shield. However, there are no guarantees that an anti-ballistic missile system will aid security this time. While a missile shield appears to merely step up the arms race, Russia has a host of options with which it may respond to the latest deployment of missile interceptors rather than engaging in developing its own missile defense system. Russia could decide to secure their superpower status by redeploying an increased number of strategic nuclear weapons, if chosen as the best course of action, this would destabilize the current agreements between the United States and Russia on the deployment of strategic nuclear weapons.

Last week Russian President Vladimir Putin (seen in image to the left) brought forth strong rhetoric, warning the United States that "Analogous actions by the Soviet Union when it deployed rockets on Cuba provoked the Cuban missile crisis," said Putin. "For us, technologically, the situation is very similar. On our borders such threats to our country are being created." Russia views the United States’ missile shield installments in the former Soviet Union satellite states of Poland and the Czech Republic, now NATO members, as a return to the policy of containment aimed at decreasing Russia’s strategic deterrence. In my opinion, moving ahead with a missile defense system, which as yet has not demonstrated a high accuracy of success, is unwise because it creates a diplomatic problem with Russia long before such action would be necessary. Keeping a potential adversary such as Russia on its toes is one thing, but cornering the bear is quite another.

Russia has alluded to the possibility of reassembling its intermediate range nuclear forces, a class of weapon that was previously removed as a result of the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty. If Russian INFs were to materialize, then it is likely the United States would also bring INFs back onto the table. This could result in a reemergence of the Cold War era arms race. While both the United States and the Russian Federation have made offers to include or aid the other in the creation of such a missile shield, the United States has said that Russia has offered nothing new and Russia clearly does not want to be taken onboard for another costly military acquisition project. It would be better for the United States to continue perfecting the missile defense technology while attempting to gain greater support from Russia to lessen to diplomatic repercussions.

Although Putin has drawn parallels to the present situation and the Cuban missile crisis, he has made it clear that tensions have not reached a critical point because of the improved nature of Russian-American relations. Putin has pointed out the singular importance of such relations saying, "the relations of trust, help to smooth such problems. I have a full right to describe him [ President Bush] as my personal friend as he calls me his friend." However, once Putin and Bush leave office, there will no longer be a personal relation of trust to depend upon (seen in image to the right). Though a missile shield could be of strategic value, it would not be in the interest of the United States to cause the destruction of progress in removing INFs. The best result of creating a missile defense system would come from the world nuclear powers, such as Russia and the United States, working together to ensure the threat of strategic nuclear warfare is eliminated for all states. Without such cooperation, it is possible that for the foreseeable future, nuclear weapon states which cannot afford missile defense systems will instead deploy more strategic nuclear missiles to compensate for the amount of interceptors deployed by adversaries. This would be a large step backward toward the security issues realized during the Cold War with the massive deployment of strategic nuclear forces.

Who Wants War?: Is War Against States Seeking Nuclear Weapons Inevitable?

Since its use during the Cold War, the policy of deterrence has brought to mind images of huge arrays of conventional military force backed by nuclear weapons. Although this seems logical when we discuss deterrence today, it is crucial to alter this perception in the mind and also to understand the importance of such a change. While the United States and Soviet Union did have physical displays of both conventional and unconventional weapons, an example seen in the image to the left, a policy of deterrence has two parts of equal importance: the first is physical display of force, shown above as proof of capabilities and the second is clear statement of deterrence directed towards those being deterred. To deter another, one must openly show the means and willingness of retaliation to make clear that the intention behind the physical force buildup and stern diplomacy are purely actions of defense through deterrence.

Despite the end of the Cold War, the United States retains military power great enough that any and all nations should respect such power and be deterred from taking actions against the will of the global hegemonic power, the United States. However, since the 1990s, states such as North Korea, Iran, Iraq, and Syria have seen the military force meant to deter them from the quest to acquire nuclear weapons and yet have continued in the same direction. Even multilateral efforts such as the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty seem unable to halt further proliferation. How is it that the United States could deter the Soviet Union, the largest conventional and unconventional force in the world, but not have the ability to stop Iran in its pursuit of nuclear capability? With only two pieces to the puzzle of the policy of deterrence it is clear that a breakdown has occurred in the perception of the United States, its opponents, or both of relative capabilities or intentions. Although it may well be argued that even the United States cannot fully appreciate its military might, there is an overwhelming amount of data to suggest that the problem in utilizing deterrence is the lack of a clear intention of the United States (global military spending seen in image to the right).

The last couple of weeks have seen both President Bush and Vice President Cheney giving speeches which harshly critiqued Iran’s current policy of pursuing nuclear weapons (Vice President Cheney seen in image to the left). The vice president said “We will not allow Iran to have nuclear weapons,” reiterating a statement which is by no means an anomaly isolated to the United States. Many western nations have shared similar viewpoints through speeches, such as the French President Sarkozy. Last week President Bush said he had “told people that if you’re interested in avoiding World War III, it seems like you ought to be interested in preventing them from having the knowledge to make a nuclear weapon,” he went on saying “The whole strategy is that, you know, at some point in time leaders or responsible folks inside of Iran may get tired of isolation and say, ‘This isn’t worth it,’ and to me it’s worth the effort to keep the pressure on this government.”

Although at first glance this rhetoric may appear to just be the Bush administration rattling its saber at Iran (or the other way around), such provocative statements must be examined individually rather than assuming that action or resolve will not follow. It is vital to bear in mind that the words spoken by a nation’s leader are heard by a larger audience than the state. Such statements delivered by world leaders are examined by all listeners in an attempt to grasp the state’s intentions. But here is the dreadful chance; no two people have identical perceptions of the world and certainly not of volatile statements. Thus, just as democrats and republicans are likely to disagree on President Bush’s intentions, which fueled the remarks quoted above, people around the world will have different perceptions which shape their views of such statements. It may well be that Mahmoud Ahmadinejad hears Western leaders clearly threatening war if demands are not met, but does not believe that they are anything more than politicians being tough.

The study of war, within the field of international relations has given rise to viewing misperception as a possible cause of war between nation-states. With the exponential growth in global communications and relative ease with which words now travel, it is vital to understand how perceptions are different around the globe. This variance of perception affects a state’s ability to perceive other states’ intentions and capabilities. As such, theory dictates that states which do not trust or feel a close bond with the United States may overestimate or underestimate its capabilities, but even if they correctly perceive the United States capabilities, there is still a high risk that they will misperceive the intentions of the United States. I offer no conclusion on whether such misperception is a cause, fuel, or trigger of controversies surrounding nuclear proliferation. Instead I bring this into light so that others may realize the weight of words. The old saying that actions speak louder than words may well be proven false if words alone ignite actions. It would be prudent for all states to evaluate other states’ perception of them, its capabilities and intentions, while also reevaluating their own perception.

When the Sound of Hooves is a Zebra: Understanding the Threat Posed by the Current Nuclear Powers

The dilemma within Pakistan over the presidential election revolves around the basic ideas held in the study of international relations, about stability and the peaceful transfer of power. It is through this basic lens that states are judged to be stable or not based upon how readily power is transferred and if it is peaceful and efficient. General, President, and Chief of the Army Staff of Pakistan (which ever you prefer, he holds all these offices) Pervez Musharraf, has won the recent presidential election in Pakistan (Musharraf seen in image to the left). Now, pending a decision of Pakistan’s highest court, there is a possibility for Pakistan to make great strides towards democracy and stability. Musharraf has promised to step down from his military role in Pakistan and become a civilian president. This would be a wonderful achievement for Pakistan to begin a tradition of peaceful transfer of power. However, in all nuclear weapon states, including Pakistan and even Russia (with Vladimir Putin set to leave office in March 2008), the most important aspect of a transfer of power is who will gain or retain the launch authority for the state’s nuclear weapons (Putin seen in image to the right).

Currently, the world is focused on the possible crisis of “rogue” states or terrorist group’s acquiring weapons of mass destruction and, more specifically, nuclear weapons or materials. While this is a legitimate concern for international security and peace, and halting further proliferation of WMDs is a crucial part, there is the danger that this focused fear over states such as Iran and North Korea has caused much of the world to forget the big picture. When the functions of and reasons for a nation state are broken down to the smallest elements, it is clear that on the most basic level, states exist to provide security for its population. In order for there to be true security, the nation state must examine the full spectrum of threats poised. In short, although it is necessary to be active in halting proliferation of WMDs to ensure a safer future, the greater threat still resides in those states which already possess these weapons and the means of delivery.

The world must never be lulled into a false sense of security regarding nuclear weapons which states already possess. In the post Cold War years, it has become easier for the population as a whole to discount the danger of nuclear weapons states. The idea behind this is not entirely flawed. After all, despite terrible diplomatic relations between the Soviet Union and the United States at times, no nuclear war was ever initiated, even with the paranoia and fear present on both sides. The answer to the riddle of the Cold War’s benign nature is quite simple. The fear perceived at the time propelled the nuclear launch authority into the hands of the highest echelon of leaders for two reasons: first to require that only the highest leaders or officers could act or react quickly and to increase the likelihood that these weapons would not be launched unless there was a confirmed launch from the other side. Both the United States and Soviet Union always kept the briefcase containing the launch codes, known as the “football,” at hand at all times, a tradition which remains unchanged to this day (seen in image to the left). The continuing practice of this policy serves to underscore the ability, and the vigilance shows stability. At any given moment the nation and the states of the world know that President Bush and President Vladimir Putin hold this power. This serves to show to the world how these leaders view the importance of this authority to the point where it is a personal and physical task which they undertake to ensure that no one else holds this power.

In the United States, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom, the French Republic, and the People’s Republic of China there is a predictable and stable transfer of nuclear launch authority in the event of a new leader or through the chain of command in the case of the leader being incapacitated. Even at the fall of the Soviet Union, the launch authority was transferred from Mikhail Gorbachev to Boris Yeltsin almost seamlessly. However, in respect to any nation-state this cannot be held to be universal, nor should it be assumed that this will continue indefinitely.

The current situation in Pakistan has brought to light this exact concern. If the court decides that Musharraf was not a legal candidate for the election, then it is inconceivable that he will step down from power. It is more likely that he would remain the chief of the army and continue to control Pakistan and perhaps more importantly, its nuclear arsenal. A democratic Pakistan would be a positive force in the region and allow the people to decide their own fate as a whole. While this is an alluring possibility, it cannot come at the expense of having stable control over Pakistan’s nuclear weapons. In all probability Musharraf will remain the President of Pakistan and make arrangements to step down as chief of the army. In fact he has already promoted high level officers in anticipation of just such an event. However, although this would be a great step forward for Pakistan as a nation, the world will still be left with the question of what happens next.

Who has the launch authority? Are there multiple persons within a state with this authority? Perhaps most importantly, who will this authority pass to, how will it pass, and when will it pass? These questions must be asked every day. It is these questions and the uncertainty surrounding them which make the evaluations of nuclear powers such a central part of security studies for any and all states.

The Bigger Picture: Looking Beyond Dangers Suggested in the Media

Discussion of international politics has become all but impossible without the mention of weapons of mass destruction. Whether it is headline news or political rhetoric, the term WMD has become a familiar word and is common in world news media. Although most understand the meaning behind the term, it is surprisingly rare to hear news on certain aspects of weapons of mass destruction. Nuclear proliferation issues throughout the world are discussed in the media almost every day, amplified by the current controversies over Iran and North Korea, but what of the other categories of WMDs, such as chemical weapons? A prudent observer of international politics or security must ask why greater attention is not being given to chemical weapons. Is proliferation of chemical weapons less of a threat than nuclear weapons?

This year marks the 10th anniversary of the Chemical Weapons Convention (the cousin to the NPT) which was created to aid in the universal elimination of chemical weapons. “The 6 States Parties which have declared chemical weapons must destroy over 8,670,000 items, including munitions and containers —containing in total, over 71,000 metric tonnes of extremely toxic chemical agents.” The time table set for the complete destruction of these stockpiles has come and gone and the CWC has extended the end date to 2012 because of difficulties encountered. To date the CWC reports that only 30% of these chemicals have been destroyed. To put the danger of chemical weapons into perspective, it must be realized that the majority of the chemicals stockpiled are nerve agents such as VX and Sarin, a large portion of which are stored in small munitions (as seen in the image to the left).

The scope of this threat can only be realized by understanding the ease with which one or more of these weapons could be acquired and smuggled throughout the world. Chemical weapons sealed in an appropriate container are relatively inconspicuous, unlike nuclear weapons which are detectable because of the radiation emitted and biological weapons which are highly dangerous and unstable to transport. Substances such as VX and Sarin may be placed in small containers or munitions and present fewer difficulties in their transportation and almost no complexities with regards to detonation.

These weapons are small, highly mobile, and extremely lethal. Although there has been progress towards the destruction of the declared chemical stockpiles of six of the CWC member states, there remains a need for great haste and additional caution regarding these weapons.
Chemical weapons remain a highly dangerous and an abundant threat to the world. For example, Russia (a member of the CWC which has declared its stockpile) possessed approximately 40,000 metric tons of chemical agents. Although the United States and other nations are aiding Russia in the construction of multiple facilities for the ultimate destruction of these weapons, it is unlikely that Russia will meet the 2012 deadline. The danger behind this is that Russian chemical weapons are stored above ground in structures that are not armored and which employ almost no means of adequate security. As seen in image to the right, these storage facilities are sheet metal buildings secured with bars and padlocks and very few guards.

The dismal conditions of Russian storage sites are unfortunately not an exception to the rule. There are numerous states which store chemical weapons in a similar fashion to Russia, such as Albania; one of its current storage facilities can be seen in the image to the right. Because there are numerous states which produced or possess chemical weapons, a majority of these being undeclared, the issue of cataloging and securing chemical weapons from terrorists or rogue states is an even greater task than that of nuclear materials and weapons. Unlike biological weapons which have a short shelf life, or nuclear weapons that require considerable maintenance, chemical weapons require only the creation process. Once created chemical agents have proven that they can remain lethal for generations.

The danger lies in the lack of public awareness. Everyone has seen videos of atomic bombs being detonated, demonstrating their awesome destructive power, which truly is a terrifying sight. However, very few have been witness to the incredible power of modern chemical weapons. In the case of VX, a dose of 30 micrograms is lethal to a human. This means that 100grams of VX has the ability to kill over 3,000,000 people. To put this into perspective, 100grams is the weight of my cell phone.

It is absolutely necessary for the world to understand the danger chemical weapons pose to humanity and be aware that these weapons are a current threat on a scale similar to nuclear weapons, both in terms of proliferation and quantity. This brief overview should serve to inform governments, individuals, and the media that a discussion of the dangers regarding WMDs must not be limited to nuclear weapons, but must include all categories of WMDs, especially the grave threat of chemical weapons.