A Nuclear Syria: Lost Reality or Just a Dream?

This week I decided to explore the blogosphere in search of discussion on the current Syrian nuclear issue. I found two blogs which had posted on the issue surrounding the actual location of what Dr. Jeffery Lewis calls the “Box-on-the-Euphrates.” The first blog I chose was one written by the administrator of DPRK Studies, Richardson. I selected this blog because it is a good resource which is focused on North Korea and allowed easy access to debate on this subject from a different viewpoint. The second blog I posted on was Arms Control Wonk, which is written by Dr. Jeffery Lewis, a well respected author and researcher of security studies within international relations. I selected Dr. Lewis’ blog because it is a reputable source which addresses nuclear security studies. (Image to the left is a 2003 photo which may be compared to the images below taken in 2007.)

Comment:

Dear Richardson,

In general, I am not one to water statistics; however, in this case I believe that prudence dictates evaluation of the possibility that Syria may not be pursuing a nuclear weapons program. In your post you discussed that “Israel says the fast cleanup of the site shows Syria had something to hide.” Such a statement may well be correct and certainly, a “fast cleanup” regarding an issue of this level of sensitivity necessitates suspicion. In this case, it would seem that Syria is hiding something, but the most important question is whether Syria is attempting to conceal strength or weakness? A cornered animal is not safe, which is to say, taking away a state’s options is a dangerous policy if the ability to wage war has not been likewise removed. Although history may not be an accurate guide for current or future foreign policy prescriptions, in this case, it would be wise to take note of the fact that in the recent past, the world experienced a similar situation in Iraq.

Syria is currently in a tough position for any state. Iraq, after the Persian Gulf War, appeared to carry on a similar game of charades. While the presence WMDs within Iraq remains a contentious issue, there were reasons for the majority of Western intelligence groups to believe that Iraq did indeed have such programs because of the stance taken by Saddam Hussein. Saddam was stuck between a rock and a hard place. While appearing to seek and possess WMDs put Iraq at risk for a clash with the West, not having the deterrent value of these weapons may well have placed Iraq at greater risk vis-à-vis their neighbors. Both Syria and states which oppose a nuclear Syria must examine their perceptions of the intentions and capabilities of one another in earnest in order to circumvent the possibility for error surrounding guessing. As Sir Arthur Conan Doyle wrote: “I never guess. It is a capital mistake to theorize before one has data. Insensibly one begins to twist facts to suit theories, instead of theories to suit facts.” Syria would do well to select its reactions and statements carefully or risk a misunderstanding leading to a possible preemptive war. The intentions of Syria, which were already in doubt around the globe, have been further clouded by this recent event.

That Syria is hiding something appears obvious. However, there is the possibility that they are hiding a lack of nuclear capability. Their desire to deceive the world may be a response to a regional security dilemma, which Syria may perceive as a greater threat than intervention from the Western powers. Sometimes looking like a bully is enough to cause peers to fear you, even if no one has been witness to such evidence.

Thanks for your time.

Comment:

Dear Dr. Jeffery Lewis,

Though I understand the intention of your post, to clarify the geographical position of this site in relation to people, once this fact has been established, the discussion should turn to the more pressing issue of whether or not this site/location is viable as a nuclear facility. Although, a “remote” location for a nuclear facility may allow a government greater ease with which to monitor security and maintain secrecy, these are only some of the variables that are necessary to evaluate and prioritize selection for a nuclear reactor location. Absent a great deal of data regarding possible nuclear sites examined by Syria, it would be impossible to decide, what criteria made a site by the Euphrates the best choice.

I draw no conclusion whether or not this was a good choice for the site. Though many could point to the destruction of this “box” as proof in itself, it would be intellectually dishonest to make such a statement without first attempting to answer three critical questions. Is the “Box-on-the-Euphrates” the most remote location within Syria? Is it the most remote location which still has ready access to fresh water? Was this site the most remote location within Syria which still had access to the means of heavy transportation necessary to build a nuclear reactor secretly?

Obviously, the details and method used by Syria to select this site are not available. However, by evaluating the possible factors which could rule out other locations, the logic behind such a location may become more transparent.

Thanks for your time.

Who Wants War?: Is War Against States Seeking Nuclear Weapons Inevitable?

Since its use during the Cold War, the policy of deterrence has brought to mind images of huge arrays of conventional military force backed by nuclear weapons. Although this seems logical when we discuss deterrence today, it is crucial to alter this perception in the mind and also to understand the importance of such a change. While the United States and Soviet Union did have physical displays of both conventional and unconventional weapons, an example seen in the image to the left, a policy of deterrence has two parts of equal importance: the first is physical display of force, shown above as proof of capabilities and the second is clear statement of deterrence directed towards those being deterred. To deter another, one must openly show the means and willingness of retaliation to make clear that the intention behind the physical force buildup and stern diplomacy are purely actions of defense through deterrence.

Despite the end of the Cold War, the United States retains military power great enough that any and all nations should respect such power and be deterred from taking actions against the will of the global hegemonic power, the United States. However, since the 1990s, states such as North Korea, Iran, Iraq, and Syria have seen the military force meant to deter them from the quest to acquire nuclear weapons and yet have continued in the same direction. Even multilateral efforts such as the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty seem unable to halt further proliferation. How is it that the United States could deter the Soviet Union, the largest conventional and unconventional force in the world, but not have the ability to stop Iran in its pursuit of nuclear capability? With only two pieces to the puzzle of the policy of deterrence it is clear that a breakdown has occurred in the perception of the United States, its opponents, or both of relative capabilities or intentions. Although it may well be argued that even the United States cannot fully appreciate its military might, there is an overwhelming amount of data to suggest that the problem in utilizing deterrence is the lack of a clear intention of the United States (global military spending seen in image to the right).

The last couple of weeks have seen both President Bush and Vice President Cheney giving speeches which harshly critiqued Iran’s current policy of pursuing nuclear weapons (Vice President Cheney seen in image to the left). The vice president said “We will not allow Iran to have nuclear weapons,” reiterating a statement which is by no means an anomaly isolated to the United States. Many western nations have shared similar viewpoints through speeches, such as the French President Sarkozy. Last week President Bush said he had “told people that if you’re interested in avoiding World War III, it seems like you ought to be interested in preventing them from having the knowledge to make a nuclear weapon,” he went on saying “The whole strategy is that, you know, at some point in time leaders or responsible folks inside of Iran may get tired of isolation and say, ‘This isn’t worth it,’ and to me it’s worth the effort to keep the pressure on this government.”

Although at first glance this rhetoric may appear to just be the Bush administration rattling its saber at Iran (or the other way around), such provocative statements must be examined individually rather than assuming that action or resolve will not follow. It is vital to bear in mind that the words spoken by a nation’s leader are heard by a larger audience than the state. Such statements delivered by world leaders are examined by all listeners in an attempt to grasp the state’s intentions. But here is the dreadful chance; no two people have identical perceptions of the world and certainly not of volatile statements. Thus, just as democrats and republicans are likely to disagree on President Bush’s intentions, which fueled the remarks quoted above, people around the world will have different perceptions which shape their views of such statements. It may well be that Mahmoud Ahmadinejad hears Western leaders clearly threatening war if demands are not met, but does not believe that they are anything more than politicians being tough.

The study of war, within the field of international relations has given rise to viewing misperception as a possible cause of war between nation-states. With the exponential growth in global communications and relative ease with which words now travel, it is vital to understand how perceptions are different around the globe. This variance of perception affects a state’s ability to perceive other states’ intentions and capabilities. As such, theory dictates that states which do not trust or feel a close bond with the United States may overestimate or underestimate its capabilities, but even if they correctly perceive the United States capabilities, there is still a high risk that they will misperceive the intentions of the United States. I offer no conclusion on whether such misperception is a cause, fuel, or trigger of controversies surrounding nuclear proliferation. Instead I bring this into light so that others may realize the weight of words. The old saying that actions speak louder than words may well be proven false if words alone ignite actions. It would be prudent for all states to evaluate other states’ perception of them, its capabilities and intentions, while also reevaluating their own perception.