The Death Star: Meet the New Plan, Same as the Old Plan

The Cold War may be characterized as a time when fear and paranoia guided the international system to a constant security dilemma, resulting in the largest arms race and military buildup in history. Despite a persistent perception of fear, with occasional spikes resulting from incidents such as the Cuban missile crisis, or others that remain classified, few instances could compare with the genuine fear the Soviet leadership felt on March 23rd 1983. On that day, President Reagan openly called for the United States to begin development of a missile defense system, with the aim of ultimately limiting the threat of strategic nuclear ballistic missiles. In effect, President Reagan kicked the arms race up a notch. As a recent declassified United States intelligence document illustrates, the Reagan administration was aware of the possible Soviet responses to the strategic defense initiative (or SDI, also known to its detractors as "Star Wars"), but believed the benefits would outweigh the costs.

The common assumption surrounding American missile defense policy is that it will increase security for the United States and its allies. Twenty-four years after Reagan’s announcement, the Bush administration has made a similar gamble regarding possible international reactions and has begun deploying the first elements of a new missile shield. However, there are no guarantees that an anti-ballistic missile system will aid security this time. While a missile shield appears to merely step up the arms race, Russia has a host of options with which it may respond to the latest deployment of missile interceptors rather than engaging in developing its own missile defense system. Russia could decide to secure their superpower status by redeploying an increased number of strategic nuclear weapons, if chosen as the best course of action, this would destabilize the current agreements between the United States and Russia on the deployment of strategic nuclear weapons.

Last week Russian President Vladimir Putin (seen in image to the left) brought forth strong rhetoric, warning the United States that "Analogous actions by the Soviet Union when it deployed rockets on Cuba provoked the Cuban missile crisis," said Putin. "For us, technologically, the situation is very similar. On our borders such threats to our country are being created." Russia views the United States’ missile shield installments in the former Soviet Union satellite states of Poland and the Czech Republic, now NATO members, as a return to the policy of containment aimed at decreasing Russia’s strategic deterrence. In my opinion, moving ahead with a missile defense system, which as yet has not demonstrated a high accuracy of success, is unwise because it creates a diplomatic problem with Russia long before such action would be necessary. Keeping a potential adversary such as Russia on its toes is one thing, but cornering the bear is quite another.

Russia has alluded to the possibility of reassembling its intermediate range nuclear forces, a class of weapon that was previously removed as a result of the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty. If Russian INFs were to materialize, then it is likely the United States would also bring INFs back onto the table. This could result in a reemergence of the Cold War era arms race. While both the United States and the Russian Federation have made offers to include or aid the other in the creation of such a missile shield, the United States has said that Russia has offered nothing new and Russia clearly does not want to be taken onboard for another costly military acquisition project. It would be better for the United States to continue perfecting the missile defense technology while attempting to gain greater support from Russia to lessen to diplomatic repercussions.

Although Putin has drawn parallels to the present situation and the Cuban missile crisis, he has made it clear that tensions have not reached a critical point because of the improved nature of Russian-American relations. Putin has pointed out the singular importance of such relations saying, "the relations of trust, help to smooth such problems. I have a full right to describe him [ President Bush] as my personal friend as he calls me his friend." However, once Putin and Bush leave office, there will no longer be a personal relation of trust to depend upon (seen in image to the right). Though a missile shield could be of strategic value, it would not be in the interest of the United States to cause the destruction of progress in removing INFs. The best result of creating a missile defense system would come from the world nuclear powers, such as Russia and the United States, working together to ensure the threat of strategic nuclear warfare is eliminated for all states. Without such cooperation, it is possible that for the foreseeable future, nuclear weapon states which cannot afford missile defense systems will instead deploy more strategic nuclear missiles to compensate for the amount of interceptors deployed by adversaries. This would be a large step backward toward the security issues realized during the Cold War with the massive deployment of strategic nuclear forces.

Who Wants War?: Is War Against States Seeking Nuclear Weapons Inevitable?

Since its use during the Cold War, the policy of deterrence has brought to mind images of huge arrays of conventional military force backed by nuclear weapons. Although this seems logical when we discuss deterrence today, it is crucial to alter this perception in the mind and also to understand the importance of such a change. While the United States and Soviet Union did have physical displays of both conventional and unconventional weapons, an example seen in the image to the left, a policy of deterrence has two parts of equal importance: the first is physical display of force, shown above as proof of capabilities and the second is clear statement of deterrence directed towards those being deterred. To deter another, one must openly show the means and willingness of retaliation to make clear that the intention behind the physical force buildup and stern diplomacy are purely actions of defense through deterrence.

Despite the end of the Cold War, the United States retains military power great enough that any and all nations should respect such power and be deterred from taking actions against the will of the global hegemonic power, the United States. However, since the 1990s, states such as North Korea, Iran, Iraq, and Syria have seen the military force meant to deter them from the quest to acquire nuclear weapons and yet have continued in the same direction. Even multilateral efforts such as the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty seem unable to halt further proliferation. How is it that the United States could deter the Soviet Union, the largest conventional and unconventional force in the world, but not have the ability to stop Iran in its pursuit of nuclear capability? With only two pieces to the puzzle of the policy of deterrence it is clear that a breakdown has occurred in the perception of the United States, its opponents, or both of relative capabilities or intentions. Although it may well be argued that even the United States cannot fully appreciate its military might, there is an overwhelming amount of data to suggest that the problem in utilizing deterrence is the lack of a clear intention of the United States (global military spending seen in image to the right).

The last couple of weeks have seen both President Bush and Vice President Cheney giving speeches which harshly critiqued Iran’s current policy of pursuing nuclear weapons (Vice President Cheney seen in image to the left). The vice president said “We will not allow Iran to have nuclear weapons,” reiterating a statement which is by no means an anomaly isolated to the United States. Many western nations have shared similar viewpoints through speeches, such as the French President Sarkozy. Last week President Bush said he had “told people that if you’re interested in avoiding World War III, it seems like you ought to be interested in preventing them from having the knowledge to make a nuclear weapon,” he went on saying “The whole strategy is that, you know, at some point in time leaders or responsible folks inside of Iran may get tired of isolation and say, ‘This isn’t worth it,’ and to me it’s worth the effort to keep the pressure on this government.”

Although at first glance this rhetoric may appear to just be the Bush administration rattling its saber at Iran (or the other way around), such provocative statements must be examined individually rather than assuming that action or resolve will not follow. It is vital to bear in mind that the words spoken by a nation’s leader are heard by a larger audience than the state. Such statements delivered by world leaders are examined by all listeners in an attempt to grasp the state’s intentions. But here is the dreadful chance; no two people have identical perceptions of the world and certainly not of volatile statements. Thus, just as democrats and republicans are likely to disagree on President Bush’s intentions, which fueled the remarks quoted above, people around the world will have different perceptions which shape their views of such statements. It may well be that Mahmoud Ahmadinejad hears Western leaders clearly threatening war if demands are not met, but does not believe that they are anything more than politicians being tough.

The study of war, within the field of international relations has given rise to viewing misperception as a possible cause of war between nation-states. With the exponential growth in global communications and relative ease with which words now travel, it is vital to understand how perceptions are different around the globe. This variance of perception affects a state’s ability to perceive other states’ intentions and capabilities. As such, theory dictates that states which do not trust or feel a close bond with the United States may overestimate or underestimate its capabilities, but even if they correctly perceive the United States capabilities, there is still a high risk that they will misperceive the intentions of the United States. I offer no conclusion on whether such misperception is a cause, fuel, or trigger of controversies surrounding nuclear proliferation. Instead I bring this into light so that others may realize the weight of words. The old saying that actions speak louder than words may well be proven false if words alone ignite actions. It would be prudent for all states to evaluate other states’ perception of them, its capabilities and intentions, while also reevaluating their own perception.

Israel in Focus: Has Israel done the dirty work once again?

This week I took an overview of the international proliferation issues being discussed throughout the blogosphere. I found two blogs which were debating the most recent actions of Israel in its alleged raid and bombing of a site within the sovereign state of Syria. The first post entitled “Syria, in the news,” is written by professor Engram at a “research university.” I commented on this blog because it has a sound argument in regards to Syria and also the important ramifications this issue encompasses regarding Iran, Israel, the United States, and Iraq. The second blog I chose is called “Captains Quarters Blog”; it discussed the upcoming peace talks, which Syria is still invited to attend. I commented on this blog because it had a different take on the issues surrounding the bombing of Syria and the upcoming peace negotiations. In both cases I have chosen to comment on different aspects of the current Syrian situation in the Middle East because I believe that although there has not been a great deal of publicity relevant to this incident, the outcome of it will have a tremendous effect on the stability of the region and the security of the world as a whole. (A visual statement of Israeli-American friendship in the image on the left)

It would seem that Syria has acted on a perception of the international community which was in no way a realistic view. It is possible that in its current situation, Syria believed that the only way to remain a sovereign power in the region was to continue its pursuit of weapons of mass destruction and thus has been acting in a similar fashion to Iran. In Syria’s perception, building a nuclear weapons program may appear to be the most readily available way of preserving their existence and security. “Given that Syria is suicidally pursuing WMDs” this would seem like folly, but it has been observed in the recent past that rogue states which attempt to develop nuclear weapons ultimately profit, either through economic incentives, or from operating under the cover of fear in the international community that they may use such a device if antagonized, or the possibility of them passing such materials or devices on to non-state actors such as Al-Qaeda.

With the new developments linking Iran, North Korea, and Syria in efforts to establish programs to create nuclear weapons, it seems even less likely that the peace conference of the Middle East States will make any headway, assuming that with current tensions within the region such a conference can still take place. “It seems odd to include Syria in this conference, given current circumstances. The US just green-lighted an attack on a rogue nuclear facility in Syria.” However, it is interesting that the advantage of intelligence information and preemptive action has tilted further back towards Israel and the United States. But, there is another possibility which must not be overlooked. With the Western powers united against proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East, the increased pressure on the Middle East as a whole may force the parties to come to better terms. It is unlikely that this will come to pass in the near future because support from Western powers will be based on proof provided by Israel and/or the United States that Syria and North Korea were cooperating to create a nuclear Syria. (A more sinister relationship in the image on the right)