When the Sound of Hooves is a Zebra: Understanding the Threat Posed by the Current Nuclear Powers

The dilemma within Pakistan over the presidential election revolves around the basic ideas held in the study of international relations, about stability and the peaceful transfer of power. It is through this basic lens that states are judged to be stable or not based upon how readily power is transferred and if it is peaceful and efficient. General, President, and Chief of the Army Staff of Pakistan (which ever you prefer, he holds all these offices) Pervez Musharraf, has won the recent presidential election in Pakistan (Musharraf seen in image to the left). Now, pending a decision of Pakistan’s highest court, there is a possibility for Pakistan to make great strides towards democracy and stability. Musharraf has promised to step down from his military role in Pakistan and become a civilian president. This would be a wonderful achievement for Pakistan to begin a tradition of peaceful transfer of power. However, in all nuclear weapon states, including Pakistan and even Russia (with Vladimir Putin set to leave office in March 2008), the most important aspect of a transfer of power is who will gain or retain the launch authority for the state’s nuclear weapons (Putin seen in image to the right).

Currently, the world is focused on the possible crisis of “rogue” states or terrorist group’s acquiring weapons of mass destruction and, more specifically, nuclear weapons or materials. While this is a legitimate concern for international security and peace, and halting further proliferation of WMDs is a crucial part, there is the danger that this focused fear over states such as Iran and North Korea has caused much of the world to forget the big picture. When the functions of and reasons for a nation state are broken down to the smallest elements, it is clear that on the most basic level, states exist to provide security for its population. In order for there to be true security, the nation state must examine the full spectrum of threats poised. In short, although it is necessary to be active in halting proliferation of WMDs to ensure a safer future, the greater threat still resides in those states which already possess these weapons and the means of delivery.

The world must never be lulled into a false sense of security regarding nuclear weapons which states already possess. In the post Cold War years, it has become easier for the population as a whole to discount the danger of nuclear weapons states. The idea behind this is not entirely flawed. After all, despite terrible diplomatic relations between the Soviet Union and the United States at times, no nuclear war was ever initiated, even with the paranoia and fear present on both sides. The answer to the riddle of the Cold War’s benign nature is quite simple. The fear perceived at the time propelled the nuclear launch authority into the hands of the highest echelon of leaders for two reasons: first to require that only the highest leaders or officers could act or react quickly and to increase the likelihood that these weapons would not be launched unless there was a confirmed launch from the other side. Both the United States and Soviet Union always kept the briefcase containing the launch codes, known as the “football,” at hand at all times, a tradition which remains unchanged to this day (seen in image to the left). The continuing practice of this policy serves to underscore the ability, and the vigilance shows stability. At any given moment the nation and the states of the world know that President Bush and President Vladimir Putin hold this power. This serves to show to the world how these leaders view the importance of this authority to the point where it is a personal and physical task which they undertake to ensure that no one else holds this power.

In the United States, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom, the French Republic, and the People’s Republic of China there is a predictable and stable transfer of nuclear launch authority in the event of a new leader or through the chain of command in the case of the leader being incapacitated. Even at the fall of the Soviet Union, the launch authority was transferred from Mikhail Gorbachev to Boris Yeltsin almost seamlessly. However, in respect to any nation-state this cannot be held to be universal, nor should it be assumed that this will continue indefinitely.

The current situation in Pakistan has brought to light this exact concern. If the court decides that Musharraf was not a legal candidate for the election, then it is inconceivable that he will step down from power. It is more likely that he would remain the chief of the army and continue to control Pakistan and perhaps more importantly, its nuclear arsenal. A democratic Pakistan would be a positive force in the region and allow the people to decide their own fate as a whole. While this is an alluring possibility, it cannot come at the expense of having stable control over Pakistan’s nuclear weapons. In all probability Musharraf will remain the President of Pakistan and make arrangements to step down as chief of the army. In fact he has already promoted high level officers in anticipation of just such an event. However, although this would be a great step forward for Pakistan as a nation, the world will still be left with the question of what happens next.

Who has the launch authority? Are there multiple persons within a state with this authority? Perhaps most importantly, who will this authority pass to, how will it pass, and when will it pass? These questions must be asked every day. It is these questions and the uncertainty surrounding them which make the evaluations of nuclear powers such a central part of security studies for any and all states.